Secularism in Turkey

In Turkey, secularism or laicism (see laïcité) was first introduced with the 1928 amendment of the Constitution of 1924, which removed the provision declaring that the "Religion of the State is Islam", and with the later reforms of Turkey's first president Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, which set the administrative and political requirements to create a modern, democratic, secular state, aligned with Kemalism.

Nine years after its introduction, laïcité was explicitly stated in the second article of the then Turkish constitution on February 5, 1937. The current Constitution of 1982 neither recognizes an official religion nor promotes any.^[1]

The principles of Turkish secularism, and the separation of state and religion, were historically established in order to modernize the nation. This centralized progressive approach was seen as necessary not only for the operation of the Turkish government but also to avoid a cultural life dominated by superstition, dogma, and ignorance.^[2]

Turkey's concept of laiklik ("laicism") calls for the separation of state and religion, but also describes the state's stance as one of "active neutrality", which involves state control and legal regulation of religion.^[3] Turkey's actions related with religion are carefully analyzed and evaluated through the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı or simply Diyanet).^[4] The duties of the Presidency of Religious Affairs are "to execute the works concerning the beliefs, worship, and ethics of Islam, enlighten the public about their religion, and administer the sacred worshipping places".^[5]

^ "Turkey". The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency (US). 2008-07-24. Archived from the original on January 10, 2021. Retrieved 2008-08-01.
^ Daver, BÜLENT. "Secularism in Turkey". Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Başkanlığı. PROF. DR. BÜLENT DAVER. Archived from the original on 2019-03-22. Retrieved 2019-03-21. This principle, unlike in western countries, is not realized by evolutionary currents and philosophers' ideas, spread among most people throughout the century, but rather by direct and decisive action and revolutionary enthusiasm from a very small elite consisting of bureaucrats and young army officer.
^ Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi; Sözeri, Semiha. "Diyanet as a Turkish Foreign Policy Tool: Evidence from the Netherlands and Bulgaria". Religion and Politics Section of the American Political Science Association: 3, 5. Archived from the original on 19 September 2018.
^ Ahmet Erdi Öztürk (2016). "Turkey's Diyanet under AKP rule: from protector to imposer of state ideology?" (PDF). Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 16 (4): 619–635. doi:10.1080/14683857.2016.1233663. S2CID 151448076.
^ Basic Principles, Aims And Objectives Archived 2008-01-08 at the Wayback Machine, Presidency of Religious Affairs

[1] "Turkey". The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency (US). 2008-07-24. Archived from the original on January 10, 2021. Retrieved 2008-08-01.

[2] Daver, BÜLENT. "Secularism in Turkey". Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Başkanlığı. PROF. DR. BÜLENT DAVER. Archived from the original on 2019-03-22. Retrieved 2019-03-21. This principle, unlike in western countries, is not realized by evolutionary currents and philosophers' ideas, spread among most people throughout the century, but rather by direct and decisive action and revolutionary enthusiasm from a very small elite consisting of bureaucrats and young army officer.

[3] Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi; Sözeri, Semiha. "Diyanet as a Turkish Foreign Policy Tool: Evidence from the Netherlands and Bulgaria". Religion and Politics Section of the American Political Science Association: 3, 5. Archived from the original on 19 September 2018.

[4] Ahmet Erdi Öztürk (2016). "Turkey's Diyanet under AKP rule: from protector to imposer of state ideology?" (PDF). Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 16 (4): 619–635. doi:10.1080/14683857.2016.1233663. S2CID 151448076.

[5] Basic Principles, Aims And Objectives Archived 2008-01-08 at the Wayback Machine, Presidency of Religious Affairs

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]